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Abstract 
This study examined relations between 124 British children’s and their parents’ endorsements 
about the origins of three living things (human, non-human animal, plant) as reported on 
questionnaires. In addition to completing questionnaires, half of the sample discussed the 
origins of entities (n = 64) in parent-child dyads before completing the questionnaires. The 7-
year-old age group endorsed creationism more than evolution and the 10-year-old age group 
endorsed both concepts equally for all three living things. Children’s endorsements were 
correlated with their parents’ endorsements for all three living things. Children’s endorsement 
of evolutionary theory was more closely related to parent-child conversational mentions of 
evolution than to parents’ endorsement of evolutionary theory in questionnaires. A similar 
pattern was found for children’s endorsement of creationism. Parent-child conversations did 
not consistently invoke evolution or creationism even when parents endorsed a particular 
theory. Findings are interpreted in relation to the pivotal role of joint collaborative 
conversation in children’s appropriation of scientific content. 
Keywords: parent-child talk, cognitive development, understanding of evolution 
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Research inspired by a socio-cultural perspective suggests that patterns in parent-child 
talk influence children’s reasoning (Benjamin, Haden, & Wilkerson, 2010; Callanan & 
Jipson, 2001; Callanan & Valle, 2008; Hohenstein, Ash, & Callanan, 2016). For example, 
Luce, Callanan, and Smilovic (2013) found that when parents emphasized the evaluation of 
evidence as necessary for understanding science, their children also talked about evidence. In 
another study, parents’ scientific explanations about magnets predicted children’s future 
reading comprehension in science (Tenenbaum, Snow, Roach, & Kurland, 2004). From a 
socio-cultural perspective (Vygotsky, 1978), one means through which children appropriate 
reasoning about science is through co-construction of conversation with more knowledgeable 
others, such as parents, who serve as agents of cognitive socialization (Gauvain, 2001).  
Collaborative verbal exchange between parents and children also seems to play a 
pivotal role in children’s memory development. Indeed, Haden, Ornstein, Eckerman, and 
Didow (2001) found that young children spontaneously reported more details about a past 
experience one day as well as three weeks later as a result of engaging in joint verbal 
interaction with their mothers. Across studies in parent-child conversation about science and 
past events, evidence converges to suggest that conversational styles influence children’s 
reasoning and memory. Indeed, these conversations may support children in developing 
habitual patterns of thinking. These reviewed studies focus on style or the ways in which 
parents structure conversations rather than the content, or what is explicitly communicated, 
during these conversations. What remains unanswered, thus, is whether the content of such 
conversations also influence specific children’s beliefs. 
Research looking at testimony, which does not rely on parent-child conversation, 
demonstrates that children can be receptive to learning content knowledge from the testimony 
of others (Harris, 2012; Harris & Koenig, 2006; Lane & Harris, 2014). In a typical 
experimental paradigm from this literature, children are provided information by an unknown 
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speaker that conflicts with their prior perception (Lane, Harris, Gelman, & Wellman, 2014). 
Even when information is counterintuitive (Lane et al., 2014), children incorporate adults’ 
testimony into their knowledge base suggesting that children are not always stubborn 
autodidacts. Moreover, by 4 years of age children are sensitive to cultural attitudes in 
reporting that others endorse the existence of invisible, scientific entities, such as germs 
(Harris, Pasquini, Duke, Asscher, & Pons, 2006, study 1). When questioned about their own 
beliefs, 5- to 6-year-olds were more confident about the existence of invisible, scientific 
entities than beings who are frequently but not unequivocally endorsed, such as God and the 
tooth fairy (Harris et al., 2006, study 3). An important distinction between the literature on 
testimony and literature inspired by a socio-cultural theoretical perspective is that the former 
seems to be agnostic as to how the child takes up information that is endorsed by their parents 
and others in their environment. The perspective we take is that although children certainly 
incorporate some cultural beliefs and content knowledge, they are more likely to do so when 
participating in conversation with an agent of socialisation. Indeed, as noted by Gauvain 
(2002), knowledge that parents hold is instantiated in everyday situations, such as parent-
child conversations, which allow children to learn ways of thinking and to gain content 
knowledge. 
The current study focuses on whether the content rather than the style of parent-child 
conversations is related to children’s domain-specific beliefs and in particular, children’s 
endorsement of evolutionary and creationist beliefs. The present study examines relations 
between parents’ and children’s endorsement of the origins of living things as reported on 
questionnaires.   To examine the effects of conversation more fully, half of the parents and 
children additionally engaged in conversation about the origins of living things (conversation 
group). From these conversations, we were able to examine whether parents or children 
mentioned evolutionary theory or creationism as an explanation for the origins of living 
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things. This design enabled us to examine whether the content of joint conversation 
influences children’s appropriation of scientific beliefs beyond parents’ beliefs.  
Focused on children’s and parents’ beliefs, Evans (2001) found some correspondence 
between parents’ and children’s beliefs about origins. A study focused on US Christian 
children’s reasoning about the origins of entities suggests that children blend testimony from 
their culture with their naïve theories (Evans, 2001). In her study, Evans (2001) compared 
children aged 6 to 13 years from fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist Christian families. 
The fundamentalist Christians endorsed Biblical literalism in which all species were created 
by God in their present form. When reasoning about animates, children of all ages from 
fundamentalist Christian backgrounds were more likely to endorse creationist accounts than 
were those from non-fundamentalist Christian backgrounds. Similarly, 8- to 10-year-olds 
from non-fundamentalist families were more likely to endorse creationism than other 
explanations. In contrast, 11-year-old and older children from non-fundamentalist families 
equally endorsed evolutionary theory and creationism. Parents in the non-fundamentalist 
families were equally likely to endorse evolutionary and creationist processes indicating that 
only the beliefs of the oldest group of children mirrored the beliefs of their parents. 
Consistent with an argument for receptivity (Banerjee & Bloom, 2013), Harris and Koenig 
(2006) argue that the fundamentalist children internalised creationist testimony from their 
parents, whereas the non-fundamentalist children did not. It is difficult to know whether 
understanding and acceptance of God is intuitive as some have argued (e.g., Barrett, Richert, 
& Dreisenga, 2001, but see Lane, Wellman, & Evans, 2010), because parents in the non-
fundamentalist families were equally likely to endorse evolutionary and creationist processes. 
Given that Evans (2001) did not include parent-child conversations in her research, how 
parents and children co-construct information and come to joint understanding is unknown. 
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Only one previous study has examined parent-child talk about the origins of entities 
(Tare, French, Frazier, Diamond, & Evans, 2011). In a study of 12 families at an evolution 
museum exhibit, approximately 10% of adults’ and 4% of children’s talk was coded as 
involving evolutionary reasoning (Tare, et al., 2011). Each family unit mentioned evolution at 
least once. Our study differs from Tare et al. in that we included the use of creationism and 
our study did not occur in museum with an exhibit explicitly focused on evolution. In 
addition, we examine whether parent-child conversation and children’s individual beliefs 
were related. Thus, the present study extends previous research by including parent-child 
conversations about origins with parents’ and children’s endorsements of evolutionary and 
creationist theories to understand the role that co-constructed conversation plays in children’s 
understanding.  
Unlike past research on evolutionary understanding, the current study focused on 
families in the UK. The majority of research on children’s views of evolution has primarily 
been conducted in the US and in particular the midwest, which tends to ascribe religious 
explanations for the origin of species. Although the UK and the US are similar in terms of 
industrialisation, the US tends to be more religious than the UK (Micklewait & Wooldridge, 
2005).  This difference may partially account for why 78% of the UK and 40% of the US 
endorse evolutionary theory (Miller, Scott, & Okamoto, 2006).  
Stemming from differences in religiosity, children in the UK may be less likely to 
endorse creationist theory. Indeed, reasoning about God has been found to differ based on the 
degree to which children in the US receive religious training. Specifically, in a an unexpected 
contents task, religiously schooled 4.5-year-old children were more likely to report that God 
had knowledge about the contents of a box than were secularly schooled children (Lane, 
Wellman, & Evans, 2012), suggesting that they believed God was omniscient. Given that 
evolutionary theory is endorsed to a higher degree in the UK than in the US (Miller et al. 
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2006), children might endorse evolution at a younger age in the UK than in the US.  Evans 
(2001) found that not until at least age 11 did American children from non-fundamentalist 
Christian families begin to endorse evolutionary theory as much as creationist theory. Even if 
belief in creationism and intelligent design is predicated on natural developmental processes 
and constraints (Rottman & Kelemen, 2012) or is intuitive (Barret, 2004), British children 
may shift away from creationist thinking at an earlier age than American children because 
British adults should be more likely to endorse evolutionary theory than are American adults 
(Miller et al., 2006). By age 10, thus, we hypothesized that children in the UK whose parents 
strongly supported evolutionary theory would similarly support evolutionary theory more 
than creationism. Given the overwhelming support for evolutionary theory in the UK 
furthermore (Miller et al., 2006), it made sense to compare parents who strongly supported 
evolution compared to other parents. 
Based on previous literature (Evans, 2009), we hypothesized that children’s 
endorsements would be related to parents’ endorsements of the origins of living things. 
Second, we expected age difference in children’s endorsements with a greater endorsement of 
evolutionary than creationist theory in 10-year-old than 7-year-old children. Given the 
centrality of conversation and language (Gauvain, 2001; Vygotsky, 1978), we expected that 
parent-child conversations would be more strongly related to children’ endorsements than 
would parents’ endorsements in the conversation sample. Finally, to examine the process 
more fully, we examined to what degree mentioning evolutionary theory was related to 
parents’ endorsement of evolution. More specifically, we examined whether parents who 
endorsed evolution on the questionnaires consistently mentioned evolution in the parent-child 
conversations to see if there was consistency between their beliefs and behaviour. 
Method 
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Participants  
Children. The sample who engaged in parent-child conversations consisted of 32 7-
year-old children (M = 6 years, 11 months, SD = 5.88 months; ranging from 6 years, 1 month 
to 7 years 11 months; 15 girls; 17 boys) and 32 10-year-old children (M = 10 years, 0 months, 
SD = 8.69 months; ranging from 8 years, 11 months to 10 years, 11 months; 20 girls; 12 
boys) for a total of 64 children who participated in this condition with one of their parents. 
The questionnaire condition consisted of 32 7-year-old children (M = 6 years, 11 months, SD 
= 6.33 months; ranging from 6 years, 2 months to 7 years, 11 months; 16 girls; 16 boys) and 
28 10-year-old children (M = 9 years, 11 months, SD = 7.63 months; ranging from 8 years, 6 
months to 10 years, 10 months; 16 girls; 12 boys) for a total of 60 children who participated 
in this condition with one of their parents. Families were recruited from schools, after school 
activities, and newspaper advertisements. All families lived in the greater London, UK Urban 
Area. 
Parents.  There were 16 fathers and 48 mothers (M age = 41.97 years, SD = 6.03) in 
the sample who engaged in the parent-child conversation condition and 13 fathers and 47 
mothers (M age = 41.52 years, SD = 5.69) in the questionnaire condition. Parents ranged from 
having completed some secondary school (O-levels or GCSE) to graduate degrees with the 
modal response having a university degree in both samples. All parents were either born in 
the UK or moved to the UK before aged five. Families were allowed to select the parent who 
participated. We selected a sample that was representative of the UK in terms of ethnicity and 
being of a Christian-descent background. 
In the conversation condition, 54 (87.5%) of the parents identified as White, one as 
Indian British, one as Chinese British, two as mixed race, and three chose not to specify. In 
the questionnaire condition, 56 (93%) of the parents identified as White, one as Indian 
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British, and three as mixed race. The ethnic composition of the sample was representative of 
the UK (92% of the UK is White; Home Office, 2007).   
Parents were representative of UK in terms of religious background: Although many 
chose to leave the question asking about their religion blank, we pre-screened them on the 
telephone to make sure that they had been raised as Protestant (including Church of England), 
Catholic, or atheist, but of Christian descent. By Christian descent, we mean that their parents 
or grandparents needed to come from families that were Christian. (Statistics indicate that 
72% of the population identify as Christian (CIA Factbook, 2006) and only 5.4% claim a 
different religion (e.g., 2.7% Muslim) (Home Office, 2007)). In the conversation sample, of 
the 30 identifying a current religion, 22 identified as Church of England, one as Baptist, one 
as Pentecostal, four as Catholic, and two as other Protestant in the conversation sample. Ten 
parents indicated that they attended church at least once a week and five attended once a 
month, and the rest did not attend. In the questionnaire condition, of the 27 identifying a 
current religion, 15 identified as Church of England, one as evangelical Lutheran, one as 
Christian Scientist, two as Catholic, and one as other Protestant. Five parents indicated that 
they attended church at least once a week and seven attended once a month, twelve attended 
once a year, and the rest did not attend. The two samples were very similar on all 
demographic variables.  
Materials 
 Science Book. A researcher-designed book entitled, “What do you think?” was given 
to the parents and children who were in the conversation condition.  The book had 15 
different activities to disguise the study’s focus on the origins of entities. Each page either 
had an activity or text to encourage discussion. The three pages of the book that were of 
interest to this study were about humans, plants, and non-human animals. The wording of 
these questions was similar (e.g., “A long, long time ago there were no things on earth. Then 
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there were the first trees/frog/humans on earth. How do you think the first tree/deer/human 
got here?”) Each question was printed on a separate page of the book with a picture of the 
entity below the question. The additional activities included two interpersonal dilemmas (e.g., 
a child who does not want to help a classmate after being requested to do so by thy teacher), 
two physical science tasks (e.g., sinking and floating), two biological science tasks (e.g., a 
taste test), four micro-evolution questions (e.g., what will happen to people if the sun’s rays 
are too strong?) All questions were presented in a mixed order.  The exemplars of the three 
entities focused on origins differed from the questionnaire on the origins of entities other than 
for humans (i.e., deer and flowers) to allow for generalization, avoid repetition, and to 
prevent children from simply mimicking the conversations in answering subsequent 
questions. In addition, the questionnaires were given after the science book so that the parents 
and children would not know that the focus was on the origins of entities.  
Child Questionnaire. Using Evans’ (2001) protocol, children were first trained to rate 
their agreement from 0 (not at all) to 3 (a lot) with simple statements. Next, in a random order 
children were shown exemplars of a human, non human-animal (deer), plant (plant), artifact 
(chair), and a natural kind (rain) and asked to rate their agreement with six statements 
purporting to explain how the entities came to be found on earth. Statements included 
creationist (“God made it”), evolution (“it changed from a different kind of thing on earth”), 
artificialism (“a person made it”), and spontaneous generation (“came out of the ground”; 
“came from someplace else”; “just appeared”). To shorten the questionnaire and match it to 
the parent-child task, children were shown one exemplar from each category. Thus, this 
questionnaire differs from Evans (2001) who asked about more than one exemplar per 
category. Children answered the identical verbally-assisted questionnaire in both conditions. 
Answers to the questionnaires provide children’s endorsement scores. 
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 Parent Questionnaire. Parents completed basic demographic information and 
information about religious beliefs and church attendance. They also completed a written 
questionnaire identical to the children’s verbally-assisted questionnaire. Parents answered 
identical questionnaires in both conditions. Answers to the questionnaires provide parents’ 
endorsement scores. See the appendix for a copy of the questionnaire.  
Procedure 
For the conversation condition, families were given the choice of taking part in their 
homes (n = 58) or in the research lab (n = 6). Once parents had signed a consent form and 
children had given verbal assent to participate, families were instructed to discuss a science 
book with different activities. They were asked to spend at least one minute per page. On 
average, they spent about 2-5 minutes on each page. Families were asked to speak naturally 
with their child. Once families began, the researcher left families alone in front of a digital 
camcorder to complete the tasks. After the family had completed discussing the science book, 
the researcher returned to interview the child in a separate room while the parent completed 
the questionnaire. Families were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
For the questionnaire condition, families were given the choice of taking part in their 
homes (n = 54) or in the research lab (n = 6). Once parents had signed a consent form and 
children had given verbal assent to participate, the researcher interviewed the child on the 
questionnaire in a separate room while the parent completed the questionnaire. Families were 
debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Transcription and Coding. All conversations were transcribed. Starting with Evans’ 
(2001) coding system, a system for coding origin of entities was developed.  Segments were 
coded as creationism when positing God as the creator of the entity. Although positing God is 
not synonymous with creationism, the present coding followed Evans (2001) and labeled use 
of God as creationism. Evolution was coded if the discussion referenced evolution either 
PARENT-CHILD TALK 12 
 
generally or more specifically by mentioning common ancestors or change. Artificialiam was 
coded if the family made reference to something being made by people. Non-evolutionary 
science was coded when families gave answers that were scientific, but did not reference 
evolution. All other codes were other. The coding of parent-child conversations allowed for 
the mention of more than one code for the same entity rather than limiting it to one reason.  
Coders noted whether parents or children introduced the reason. We used a strict definition in 
which the person who first mentioned the term received the credit for introducing it. 
Examples of Creationism and Evolution from the conversations are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Coding Category Examples 
Category Example 
Evolution  Child: How do you think the first frog got here? 
Father:  One thing that makes that happen, is ... emerging or 
frogs or whatever, I mean this is, this is what people say, that 
um, the reason that say frogs came was that um, they like the 
lizards they had some advantage over other you know, when, 
when underwater lizards started to take on the characteristics 
of frogs, when they started to become more like frogs, but not 
quite frogs, those ones that more like frogs had an advantage, 
so they were likely to, they were less likely to die. This is 
evolution. 
Creationism Father: How do you think the first person got here? Have you 
got any thoughts about that subject? 
Child:  Don’t know urmmm there’s because... we don’t know 
do we? 
Father: What about other things that we’ve heard so for 
example have you heard about the thing from school or? 
Child: Big bang. 
Father: God or yes the big bang. 
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 Reliability. The two authors developed the coding scheme. To test for inter-rater 
reliability, each coder independently coded 12 of the transcripts (19% of the data set). 
Reliability was evaluated with kappa coefficients. Fleiss (1981) considers kappa’s between .60 
to .75 as good and over .75 as excellent.  
Reliability was achieved with a kappa of .81 for the five separate codes.  Inter-rater 
agreement ranged from .71 to 1.00 with the following kappa coefficients for individual codes: 
artificialism,   = 1.00; creationism,   = .84; other,   = .72; non-evolutionary science,   = 
.76; and evolution,   = .71.  On identification of the person who first mentioned the code, 
raters agreed 100% of the time. 
Results 
Preliminary analyses indicated no child gender effects on the parent-child talk variables 
or on children’s endorsement scores; therefore, this factor was excluded from all subsequent 
analyses. Artificialism, non-evolutionary science, and other occurred in fewer than 10% of 
the conversations, which was not enough to run analyses using these variables as dependent 
variables. 
Parental Endorsements on Written Questionnaires 
As a check that parents endorsed evolutionary processes to a greater degree than 
creationism in this sample, a Wilcoxon signed ranks test was conducted separately for each 
condition on parents’ endorsement of evolution and creationism for each of the entities based 
on questionnaire responses. Parents in the conversation condition endorsed evolutionary 
theory more than creationism for humans, Z = 5.45, p = .0001, non-human animals, Z = 5.51, 
p = .0001, and plants, Z = 5.54, p = .0001. Similarly, parents in the questionnaire only 
condition endorsed evolutionary theory more than creationism for humans, Z = 5.74, p = 
.0001, non-human animals, Z = 5.51, p = .0001, and plants, Z = 5.44, p = .0001. Figure 1 
shows parents’ mean endorsement of creationism and evolution on the human, non-human 
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animal, and plant items in the questionnaire. Parent responses on these items were similar 
across the questionnaire and conversation groups (see appendix for exact wording of these 
items). Only ten percent of parents endorsed evolutionary theory and creationism equally for 
the different entities. 
 
Figure 1. Parents’ Endorsements in the Questionnaire and Conversation Conditions 
 
 
Figure 1. Scores range from 0 (do not agree at all) to 3 (strongly agree). 
Children’s Endorsements on Questionnaires 
Figure 2 shows children’ scores split by age. Seven-year-old children supported 
creationism more than evolutionary theory, F (1, 63) = 21.80, p = .001, Partial ŋ2 = .26, 
whereas there was no difference in 10-year-olds, F (1, 59) = 1.40, p = .24.   
 
PARENT-CHILD TALK 16 
 
 
Figure 2. Children’s Endorsements of the Origins of Living Things by Age Group and Entity 
Type 
 
 
Figure 2. Scores range from 0 (do not agree at all) to 3 (strongly agree).  
 
Twenty children (16%) provided the same answer for creationism and evolutionary 
theory for humans, 28 children (23%) provided the same answer for creationism and 
evolutionary theory for deer, and 21 (17%) children provided the same answer for 
creationism and evolutionary theory for flowers. 
Relations between Parents’ and Children’s Endorsements 
The majority of parents strongly endorsed evolutionary theory, which was scored as a 
3 on the 0 to 3 scale (n = 82 out of 124, 66.1% for humans; n = 82 out of 124, 63.7% for deer, 
and n = 67 out of 124, 54% for plants). To create as close as possible to a median split, we 
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compared parents who reported strongly endorsing evolution (strongly endorse evolution) to 
parents who reported somewhat endorsing evolution, somewhat disagreeing with evolution, 
or strongly disagreeing with evolution (do not strongly endorse evolution).  We also split the 
data this way because then we could compare parents who endorsed evolution fully to those 
who did not. Table 2 shows children’s mean score on the 4-point scale by whether their 
parents strongly supported evolution or not.  
 
Table 2 
Children’s Mean Endorsements by Entity Type and Parents’ Endorsements 
 Humans 
 
Non-
human 
Animals 
 Plants  
 Evolution Creationism Evolution Creationism Evolution Creationism 
Parents Do not 
Strongly Endorse 
Evolution 
1.21  
(1.20) 
1.29  
(.99) 
1.16  
(1.08) 
2.13  
(.94) 
1.02  
(.97) 
2.11  
(1.06) 
Parents Strongly 
Endorse Evolution 
1.87  
(1.28) 
1.68  
(1.24) 
1.63  
(1.17) 
1.66  
(1.01) 
1.48 
(1.16) 
1.49  
(1.27) 
Mean 1.65  
(1.28) 
1.89  
(1.19) 
1.46  
(1.15) 
1.83  
(1.01) 
1.27 
(1.10) 
1.77  
(1.22) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Children’s scores range from 0 (do not agree at 
all) to 3 (strongly agree). 
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On the 4-point scale, parents and children selected the same option more than 25% of 
the time but less than 50% for each entity (for humans 46% of parents and children selected 
the same endorsement score on evolutionary theory, 27% on creationism; for non-human 
animals, 26.6% on evolutionary theory, 22.6% on creationism; for plants, 27.4% on 
evolutionary theory, 29% for creationism).  
Following the evolution endorsements, we had originally wanted to examine parents 
who strongly endorsed creationism to those who did not. However, there were only six 
parents strongly endorsing creationism for humans, six strongly endorsing creationism for 
non-human animals, and four strongly endorsing creationism for plants. Given such limited 
numbers, we could not examine children whose parents strongly supported creationism.   
Hypotheses Testing 
We examined the first and second hypotheses with three separate mixed-design 
ANOVAs, one for each entity. To examine the first hypothesis that children whose parents 
strongly endorsed evolution would endorse evolution more than creationism, we compared 
parents who reported strongly endorsing evolution to parents who did not strongly endorse 
evolutionary theory. Age group was included as a between-participants factor to investigate 
the second hypothesis that 10-year-old children would endorse evolution more than 
creationism, whereas 7-year-old children would endorse creationism more than evolution. 
Children’s support for evolution and creationism, for each of the living things separately, 
served as repeated factors in each separate ANOVA. Age group, parents’ dichotomous 
ratings of their endorsement for each living thing separately, and sample (conversation or 
questionnaire) served as between-participants factors. Thus, we conducted a 2 (Age: 7, 10) x 
2 (Parent Endorsement for the Entity: Strongly Endorse Evolution, Does not Strongly 
Endorse) x 2 (Sample: Conversation, Questionnaire) x 2 (Children’s Endorsements for the 
Entity: Creationism, Evolutionary Theory) repeated-measures ANOVAs for each of the three 
PARENT-CHILD TALK 19 
 
entities separately. There were no effects of sample (all F < 1). There were similar effects for 
all three entities. There were significant main effects for children’s beliefs about the non-
human animals and plants entities in which children endorsed creationism more than 
evolutionary theory (Non-human animals: F (1, 116) = 10.06, p = .001, Partial ŋ2 = .08; 
Plants: F (1,116) = 11.87, p = .001, Partial ŋ2 = .09), and a non-significant trend for humans 
in which children endorsed creationism over evolutionary theory, F (1, 116) = 4.12, p = .05, 
Partial ŋ2 = .03. In addition, interactions between Child Endorsement and Parent beliefs 
(Humans: F (1, 116) = 9.68, p = .002, Partial ŋ2 = .08; Non-human animals: F (1, 116) = 8.62, 
p = .007, Partial ŋ2 = .07; Plants: F (1, 116) = 13.55, p = .0001, Partial ŋ2 = .11) as well as 
Child Endorsement and Age (Humans: F (1, 116) = 11.70, p = .001, Partial ŋ2 = .09; Non-
human animals: F (1, 116) = 14.72, p = .001, Partial ŋ2 = .11; Plants: F (1, 116) = 10.05, p = 
.002, Partial ŋ2 = .08) were significant. The effects underlying these interactions were 
explored by conducting follow-up ANOVAs. Children endorsed creationism more than 
evolutionary theory for all entities. 
Humans. To examine the effects underlying the significant Children’s Endorsement x 
Parent Belief interaction effect, repeated-measures ANOVAs with children’s endorsement of 
creationism and evolutionary theory for the items on humans as the dependent variables were 
conducted separately for children whose parents indicated, on the items about humans, they 
strongly supported evolution and those whose parents did not. Partially confirming the first 
hypothesis that parents’ and children’s endorsements would be related, when parents strongly 
endorsed evolutionary theory for humans, children were as likely to endorse creationism as 
evolutionary theory, F(1, 81) = .58, p = .45. In contrast, when evolution was not strongly 
endorsed by parents, children endorsed creationism more than evolutionary theory, F(1, 41) = 
14.04, p = .0001, partial ŋ2 = .26. Table 2 displays these means. 
PARENT-CHILD TALK 20 
 
Second, to tease apart the Age x Child Endorsement interaction effect, repeated-
measures ANOVAs with children’s endorsement of creationism and evolutionary theory for 
humans as the dependent variables were conducted separately for 10- and 7-year-old 
children. Seven-year-old children endorsed creationism more than evolutionary theory F(1, 
63) = 12.57, p = .0001, partial ŋ2 = .17. In contrast, 10-year-old children were as likely to 
endorse creationism as evolutionary theory, F(1, 59) = 3.59, p = .07. Note the nonsignificant 
trend in which 10-year-old children’s endorsement of evolutionary theory for humans was 
nearly significantly larger than their endorsement of creationism. 
Non-human Animals. Mirroring the pattern with humans, when non-human evolution 
was strongly endorsed by parents, a repeated measures ANOVA indicated that children were 
as likely to endorse creationism as evolutionary theory, F(1, 78) = .02, p = .90. In contrast, 
when parents did not strongly endorse evolutionary theory for the deer, children endorsed 
creationism more than evolutionary theory for non-human animals, F(1, 44) = 17.70, p = 
.0001, partial ŋ2 = .29. 
Second, to tease apart the Age x Child Belief interaction effect, repeated-measures 
ANOVAs with children’s endorsement of creationism and evolutionary theory for the items 
on deer as the dependent variables were conducted separately for 7- and 10-year-old children. 
Seven-year-old children endorsed creationism more than evolutionary theory, F(1, 63) = 
21.76, p = .001, partial ŋ2 = .26. In contrast, older children were as likely to endorse 
creationism as evolutionary theory, F(1, 59) = 1.68, p = .20.  
Plants. Again, repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted separately for children 
whose parents strongly supported evolution and those whose parents did not on the item 
asking about flowers. When parents strongly endorsed evolutionary theory for the flowers, 
children were as likely to endorse creationism as evolutionary theory, F(1, 66) = .004, p = 
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.95. In contrast, when evolution was not strongly endorsed by parents, children endorsed 
creationism more than evolutionary theory, F(1, 56) = 13.55, p = .0001, partial ŋ2 = .11.  
Finally, to tease apart the Age x Child Belief interaction effect, repeated-measures 
ANOVAs with children’s endorsement of creationism and evolutionary theory for flowers as 
the dependent variables were conducted separately for 7- and 10-year-old children. Seven-
year-old children endorsed creationism more than evolutionary theory, F(1, 63) = 15.42, p = 
.0001, partial ŋ2 = .20. In contrast, 10-year-old children were as likely to endorse creationism 
as evolutionary theory, F(1, 59) = .05, p = .83. Of note, the effect sizes for the post-hoc 
analyses for each entity tend to be larger than those in the overarching analyses, suggesting 
that the post-hoc analyses pinpointed areas of relative importance for these findings. 
Conversation and Children’s Endorsements 
To examine the third hypothesis that information about the origins of entities during 
the parent-child conversations would be related to children’s beliefs even after parents’ 
beliefs were entered into the model, six regressions were conducted on the conversation 
group. Note that during conversations parents and children could invoke more than one cause 
of the origin of any given entity. Indeed, while discussing the origins of humans, 10 dyads 
invoked both creationist and evolutionary accounts, two invoked both accounts while 
discussing the non-human animal, and four invoked both accounts while discussing plants.  
Because data were ordinal and violated assumptions of normality necessary for 
standard inferential parametric statistics, we conducted ordinal regressions. For each living 
thing, ordinal regressions using the logit link function were carried out separately for 
creationist and evolutionary beliefs. For the regressions predicting children’s creationist 
views, parents’ views about creationism for that entity were entered as a covariate, and 
children’s age and whether creationism was mentioned during the discussion of the particular 
entity were entered into the model. The same procedure was followed for the prediction of 
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evolutionary beliefs with parents’ views about evolutionary theory for that entity were 
entered as a covariate, and children’s age and whether evolution was mentioned during the 
discussion of the particular entity were entered into the model. Table 3 displays the odds 
ratios and the Nagelkerke R2 (see Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013, for a discussion of  
Nagelkerke R2). 
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Table 3 
Ordinal Regressions Predicting Children’s Endorsement  
Odds ratios for Creationism 
 Humans Non-human Animals Plants 
Parents’ Endorsement 1.42 1.63 1.36 
Age group 3.97* 2.39 1.78 
Mention of God 6.75* 3.60* 3.86* 
Nagelkerke R2 .41 .29 .22 
Odds ratios for Evolutionary Theory 
 Humans Non-human Animals Plants 
Parents’ Endorsement 2.85* 1.15 1.58 
Age group 3.25* 2.36 1.67 
Mention of Evolution 5.00* 3.78* 3.74* 
Nagelkerke R2 .45 .25 .18 
Note. *p < .05 
Humans. Parents’ endorsement of creationism as indicated on the questionnaires, 
children’s age group, and whether God was mentioned during the discussions predicted 
children’s beliefs that God created humans, χ2 (3) = 29.94, p = .0001. Above and beyond 
parents’ beliefs, children’s age predicted children’s endorsement of creationism for humans, 
χ2 (1) = 6.49, p = .01. As hypothesized, mention of God during the discussions about humans 
predicted children’s endorsement, χ2 (1) = 11.03, p = .001, even after accounting for parents’ 
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beliefs. Thus, child age and mentioning God uniquely contributed to the prediction of 
children’s beliefs after parents’ beliefs were entered into the model. 
Similarly, parents’ endorsement of evolution as indicated on the questionnaires, 
children’s age group, and whether evolution was mentioned during the discussions predicted 
children’s endorsement of evolution as responsible for human origins, χ2 (3) = 33.41, p = 
.0001. Similar to creationist views about humans, above and beyond parents’ beliefs, 
children’s age predicted children’s endorsement of evolution, χ2 (1) = 4.76, p = .03. As 
hypothesized, mention of evolution during the discussions predicted children’s endorsement, 
χ2 (1) = 8.22, p = .004, above and beyond parents’ beliefs.  
Non-human Animals. Parents’ endorsement of creationism for non-human animals as 
indicated on the questionnaires, children’s age group, and whether God was mentioned 
during the discussions about frogs predicted children’s beliefs that God created non-human 
animals, χ2 (3) = 20.34, p = .0001. Above and beyond parents’ beliefs, children’s age did not 
predict children’s endorsement of creationism, χ2 (1) = 2.85, p = .09. As hypothesized, 
mention of God during the discussions predicted children’s endorsement, χ2 (1) = 4.07, p = 
.04, above and beyond parents’ beliefs.  
Parents’ endorsement of evolution for non-human animals as indicated on the 
questionnaires, children’s age group, and whether evolution was mentioned during the 
discussions about frogs predicted children’s beliefs that evolution was responsible for non-
human animals, χ2 (3) = 16.61, p = .001. Similar to children’s beliefs about creationism, 
children’s age did not predict children’s endorsement of evolution, χ2 (1) = 2.68, p = .10. 
However, mention of evolution during the discussions predicted a higher likelihood that 
children endorsed evolution, χ2 (1) = 5.13, p = .02, above and beyond parents’ beliefs.  
Plants. Finally, children’s beliefs that God created plants was predicted from children’s 
age group, whether God was mentioned during the discussions about trees, and parents’ 
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endorsement of creationism for plants, χ2 (3) = 14.76, p = .002. Similar to human-animals, 
children’s age did not predict children’s endorsement of creationism, χ2 (1) = 1.41, p = .24. 
As hypothesized, mention of God during the discussions predicted children’s endorsement, χ2 
(1) = 6.62, p = .01, above and beyond parents’ beliefs.  
Parents’ endorsement of evolution as indicated on the questionnaires, children’s age 
group, and whether evolution was mentioned during the discussions was entered into a model 
as predictors to examine children’s endorsement of evolution as responsible for plants. The 
full model predicted children’s decisions, χ2 (3) = 11.91, p = .008. Again, children’s age did 
not predict children’s endorsement of evolution, χ2 (1) = 1.11, p = .29. As hypothesized, 
mention of evolution during the discussions predicted children’s endorsement, χ2 (1) = 4.80, p 
= .03, above and beyond parents’ beliefs.  
In summary, in all of these cases, mentioning either evolution or creationism during the 
discussion contributed significantly to children’s beliefs even after parents’ beliefs were 
entered into the model. In other words, individual children’s beliefs were apparently 
influenced by mentioning God or evolution in conversation, even after parents’ beliefs were 
entered into the models. Children were more likely to mention creationism first than were 
parents (humans, 23 out of the 30 conversations in which this reason was mentioned; non-
human animals, all 14 conversations; plants, 17 out of the 21 conversations). The patterns for 
evolutionary theory were more mixed (humans, 23 out of the 30 cases; non-human animals, 
16 out of 31 conversations; plants, 5 out of the 16 conversations). For all entities, Mann-
Whitney tests indicated no effects on children’s endorsement based on which member of the 
dyad endorsed the theory first. 
Given the pattern of results, one remaining question was whether parent-child talk was 
consistent with parents’ views and more frequently invoked evolutionary theory with older 
than younger children. Table 4 displays the number of times either evolutionary theory or 
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God were mentioned in the context of conversations in relation to parent endorsements and 
child age. More specifically, the numbers in parentheses are the total number of parents 
endorsing that particular belief. The numbers to the left of the parentheses are the number of 
conversations in which the belief is mentioned out of the parents who endorse a particular 
belief. Below these numbers are the ratio of conversations in which a belief was mentioned 
compared with the total number of parents who endorse a belief. Thus, there were 13 parents 
of the younger age group who did not endorse evolution for humans strongly. Of these 13, 
evolution was mentioned in two conversations (15%). 
 
Table 4 
Mentions of Evolution or God During Conversations by Parents’ Endorsement 
 Aged 6 to 7  Aged 9 to 10  
 Mention 
Evolution 
Mention God Mention 
Evolution 
Mention God 
Human     
Do not Strongly 
Endorse 
Percentage 
2 (13)  
 
15% 
12 (13) 
 
92% 
5 (11) 
 
45% 
6 (11) 
 
55% 
Strongly Endorse 
Percentage 
9 (19) 
47% 
10 (19) 
53% 
17 (21) 
81% 
7 (21) 
3% 
Frogs     
Do not Strongly 
Endorse 
Percentage 
1 (13) 
 
7% 
9 (13) 
 
69% 
5 (12) 
 
42% 
3 (12) 
 
25% 
Strongly Endorse 
Percentage 
8 (19) 
42% 
6 (19) 
32% 
18 (20) 
90% 
1 (20) 
5% 
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Plants     
Do not Strongly 
Endorse 
Percentage 
1 (14) 
 
7% 
9 (14) 
 
64% 
5 (16) 
 
31% 
7 (16) 
 
44% 
Strongly Endorse 
Percentage 
3 (18) 
17% 
6 (18) 
33% 
7 (16) 
44% 
2 (16) 
13% 
 
To examine whether parents’ beliefs were reflected in parent-child talk in the 
conversation sample, we conducted chi-squares to examine if evolution was more likely to be 
mentioned when parents strongly endorsed evolution then when they did not and when 
children were older rather than younger. When parents strongly endorsed evolutionary theory 
for humans, χ2 (1, n = 64) = 7.71, p = .005, and non-human animals, χ2 (1, n = 64) = 11.09, p 
= .001, evolution was more likely to be mentioned in the conversations than when they did 
not. In contrast, there was no difference for plants, χ2 (1, n = 64) = .75, p = .38. Evolution was 
more likely to be mentioned in the conversations with older than younger children when 
discussing plants, χ2 (1, n = 64) = 5.33, p = .02, non-human animals, χ2 (1, n = 64) = 12.25, p 
= .0001, and humans, χ2 (1, n = 64) = 7.57, p = .006.  
Discussion 
This study examined parents’ and children’s endorsements about the origins of three 
living things. We focused on relations between parents’ and children’s endorsements as well 
as age differences in children’s beliefs. We compared children whose parents endorsed 
evolution strongly to children whose parents did not strongly endorse evolutionary theory. 
Children in the latter group endorsed creationism more than evolutionary beliefs, whereas 
children in the former group endorsed these beliefs to a similar extent. This finding supports 
the first hypothesis in that we found significant relations between parents’ and children’s 
endorsements. Partially supporting the second hypothesis that children would support 
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evolutionary theory to a greater extent with age, the 7-year-old children endorsed creationism 
more than evolutionary beliefs, whereas the 10-year-old children endorsed these beliefs to a 
similar extent. Finally, this study further focused on a sample of parents and children who 
also discussed the origins of living things together. Children’s endorsements were more 
strongly related to the parent-child conversations than to parents’ endorsements. Although 
parent-child conversations were related to parents’ beliefs, sometimes beliefs not endorsed by 
the parents were mentioned during the discussion task. These findings will be discussed in 
more detail. 
Supporting the first hypothesis, parents’ and children’s endorsements were related. This 
finding supports the role that testimony plays in children’s beliefs (Harris & Koenig, 2006). 
However, conversation played a more pivotal role in children’s endorsements than did 
parents’ endorsements, at least in the short term. Since Vygotsky (1978), developmental 
psychologists have argued that conversation is an effective method for influencing people’s 
beliefs. It seems that conversations are a particularly credible method for relaying 
information that children can appropriate and provides a credible vehicle to those arguing for 
the importance of testimony in influencing children’s conceptual development (Harris, 2012). 
Indeed, supporting the third hypothesis, the parent-child conversations predicted children’s 
beliefs even after parents’ beliefs were entered into the models first. As others have 
suggested, conversation is an important means for children to incorporate different 
epistemological stances into their thinking (Luce et al., 2013) and develop patterns of 
reasoning and memory (Haden et al., 2001). We would also argue that these conversations 
enabled children to appropriate the content of parents’ beliefs, which may be more implicit. 
The following conversation between a 6-year-old son and a father who strongly endorsed 
evolutionary theory in the questionnaires demonstrates how parents frequently guide children 
to an answer that mirrors their beliefs: 
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Child: How do you think the first tree got here? (reading) 
Child: I don't know. 
Father: Hold on, let's not give up. What do you think? 
Child: Maybe. I can never get the answer to this question. 
Father: Okay who do we know who knows a lot about how things came into being?  
Child: Charles Darwin. 
Father: What was his theory? 
Child: Evolution. 
Father: What did evolution argue? 
Child: That things evolve from other things. 
Father: So what might that suggest for trees? 
Child: That they might have evolved from smaller plants. 
Rather than telling the child what he endorses, the father in the consistent conversation 
example above co-constructs with his son how a tree might have evolved. What is striking in 
this conversation is that the parent does not explicitly tell the child to believe in either 
evolution or creationism. In conversations like this one, we would have credited children with 
introducing evolution, but the child probably could not have done so without the scaffolding 
of his father. Once the child endorses a belief, the parent then builds on the child’s idea. This 
process of co-construction supports the child in transferring knowledge from the social plane 
to the individual plane. This type of process was apparent in many of the conversations. 
Other parents who endorsed evolutionary views sometimes allowed children to express an 
idea inconsistent with the parents’ views, such as the following conversation: 
Mother: A long, long time ago there were no things on Earth. Then there were the first 
people ever. How do you think the first people got here? 
Child:  I don’t know. 
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Mother: What do you think your teacher would tell you? 
Child:  Oh God um God might have made one person. 
Mother: Do you think that? 
Child:  I don’t know. 
Mother: Can you think of any other ideas? If you were to think outside of the Bible? 
Child:  No. 
Mother: No idea at all? 
Child:  No. 
Mother: Do you think we could have got here from a monkey? 
Child:  No. What do you mean? 
Mother: Well, we start evolved from monkeys. Your teachers haven’t talked about that 
at all, no? Do you think that might be true? So how are you saying the first people got here? 
Child:  God made us. 
Although the parent endorses evolutionary theory, the parent defers to the child’s viewpoint. 
In an informal conversation with the researcher, the parent told the researcher that she did not 
want to confuse the child by supporting a reason in conflict with the child’s teacher.  
Another reason talk may have been more predictive than parents’ beliefs is because 
parent-child conversations about evolution are rare and thus, parents do not have 
opportunities to influence children’s beliefs. Future research needs to assess the frequency 
with which parents discuss the origins of entities with children. When parents shy away from 
topics, they often assume that children share their viewpoints, even when they do not (Pahkle, 
Bigler, & Suizzo, 2012). One limitation of the present study is that the assessment of beliefs 
was on the same day as the conversations. As a result, we do not know if the conversations 
would be related to children’s beliefs in the future as they continue to learn more about the 
origins of entities. Moreover, this lack of information does not inform us about the processes 
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through which children negotiate their understandings of evolutionary theory (Gauvain, 
2001). Future research should try to understand how conversations with adults and peers, as 
agents of cognitive socialisation, begin to influence children’s theory revision over time. 
Parent-child conversations were more likely to mention evolution when parents 
strongly endorsed evolution or they involved older children. Note that although the parent-
child conversations were generally related to parents’ endorsements, there were differences. 
As others have found, there are frequently inconsistencies between people’s beliefs and 
behavior (Baumann et al., 2015). Parents’ mention of God when parents strongly endorsed 
evolution may stem from parents’ beliefs that evolution is too difficult for children to 
understand. Future research should examine parents’ explanations of this difference. 
In addition to being related to parents’ endorsements, children’s endorsements varied 
with age. Interestingly, the 7-year-old group endorsed creationism more than evolutionary 
theory for humans, non-human animals, and plants. In contrast, the 10-year-old group was as 
likely to endorse creationism as evolution. Evans (2001) argues that part of the reason 
children may support creationist ideas is because of their reliance on the intuitive biases of 
essentialism and teleology. Essentialism is the idea that classes of biological entities share an 
internal essence that predicts appearance and identity (Gelman, Coley, & Gottfried, 1994). 
Teleology is the notion that biological change occurs as based on organisms’ needs (Wellman 
& Gelman, 1998). Essentialism may lead children to assume that species are static and unique 
rather than undergoing constant transformation (Shtulman & Calabi, 2012), while teleology 
may lead children to believe that change is goal-directed. Both biases may constrain 
understanding of evolutionary theory. In contrast, Kelemen, Emmons, Seston, and Ganea 
(2014) argue children cannot fully understand evolutionary theory because they lack 
knowledge of an underlying mechanism for evolutionary change. For either of these reasons, 
it seems that creationism may be easier to grasp than evolutionary theory at younger ages.  
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Nonetheless, the shift to support evolutionary theory equally with creationism seemed 
to occur a bit earlier in this British sample than what Evans (2001) found in her sample of 
non-fundamentalist families in the US. At 11 1/2 years of age in the US, children began to 
endorse evolution and creationism equally. In contrast, there is a suggestion in this study that 
UK children should begin to endorse evolution more than creationism at this age, at least for 
humans. A more uniform message from their larger cultural community may help children 
overcome the previously mentioned initial biases or developmental constraints such as 
essentialism and teleology (Harris & Koenig, 2006; Rottman & Kelemen, 2012), at a slightly 
younger age. It would be interesting to determine at what age children in the UK endorse 
evolutionary more than creationist theory to understand when they begin to resemble more 
closely their larger cultural community. Although the UK does not have a separation between 
church and state, there is more support for evolution in the UK than in the US (Miller et al., 
2006). Perhaps the testimony children receive about evolution is more supportive of 
evolutionary theory in the UK than the US. Indeed, unlike parents in the US Midwest (Evans, 
2001), parents in this study endorsed evolutionary theory more than they did creationism.  
Ten-year-olds’ simultaneous endorsement of evolution and creationism demonstrates 
that young people, like adults, combine seemingly contradictory epistemologies in 
understanding the origins of species (Legare, Evans, Rosengren, & Harris, 2012). Legare et 
al. (2012) suggest that for biological phenomena, there are different ways in which people 
combine belief systems called coexistence models. In one type of coexistence model, 
different types of reasoning are used for specific entities, which is labeled target-dependent 
reasoning. In other words, a child may posit God as the creator of humans, but evolutionary 
processes as the creator of plants (Evans, 2001). In another type, beliefs are integrated and 
one type of reasoning may be used to explain proximal causes and other types of reasoning 
used for distal causes (e.g., God set evolutionary processes in motion). Finally, synthetic 
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blends are when people do not integrate different causal mechanisms. Research suggests that 
people tend to use a combination of reasoning strategies for explaining the origins of entities. 
Indeed, even museum visitors, who are more likely than the general population to support 
evolutionary ideas (Spiegel, Evans, Gram, & Diamond, 2006), were found to use a variety of 
reasoning patterns including evolutionary and creationist processes to describe the origins of 
entities (Evans, et al., 2009).  It seems that the older children included an additional theory 
(evolution) without dispelling previous understandings (creationism). Similar to other areas 
of science (Panagiotaki, Nobes, & Potton, 2009), it seems thus, that young people may not 
hold coherent theories across different living things and slowly incorporate cultural notions, 
such as science, into their views (see Harris & Koenig, 2006, for a discussion of the 
testimony children receive).  
In sum, this study extends previous research by demonstrating that the content of 
children’s beliefs about the origins of species may be informed by conversations with their 
parents. As Evans et al. (2011) have noted, people need to negotiate the difficult task of 
reconciling seemingly inconsistent explanatory frameworks for everyday biological 
phenomena. This study suggests that parent-child conversations can contribute to the content 
of children’s explanatory frameworks implicating collaborative verbal exchange as an 
important social factor in children’s construction of the physical and natural world. 
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Appendix. Questions asked about Deer, Humans, and Flowers 
 
How did the very first deer get here on earth?  
a. God made the very first deer. 
strongly disagree somewhat disagree somewhat agree strongly agree 
b. A person made the very first deer and put it on earth. 
strongly disagree somewhat disagree somewhat agree strongly agree 
c. The deer changed from a different kind of animal that used to live on earth. 
strongly disagree somewhat disagree somewhat agree strongly agree 
d. The deer just appeared. 
strongly disagree somewhat disagree somewhat agree strongly agree 
e. The deer came out of the ground. 
strongly disagree somewhat disagree somewhat agree strongly agree 
f. It came from someplace else. 
strongly disagree somewhat disagree somewhat agree strongly agree 
 
